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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we design a multi-dimensional index to measure the quality of Corporate Governance 
systems adopted by firms and use it to investigate the correlation between Corporate Governance 
quality and firm value. 
Unlike most studies that examine the relationship between only one dimension of Governance and 
firm value,  we present a complex index (CGI) composed of 39 variables referable to four 
dimensions: Board, Remuneration, Shareholder Rights and Disclosure. 
By analysing a sample of 100 large companies listed on the main stock markets in five different 
countries over three years (2009-2011), we confirm the widespread hypothesis of the existence of a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between Corporate Governance, as measured by a 
subset of 12 variables, and firm value. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance can be defined as the system used to manage and control firms; it consists of 
a set of market and regulatory mechanisms which indicate how to manage a company, including the 
relationships among different stakeholders and the objectives of the company.  
The main parties involved in Corporate Governance include authorities and regulators, markets, 
management, Board of Directors and shareholders. Other relevant stakeholders are financiers, 
suppliers, employees, creditors, clients and the external community in general. All these parties 
invest some kind of capital in the company (financial, physical, human, etc.), therefore they are 
interested in the financial and social performances of the company. A key factor in their investment 
decision is the level of their confidence on the ability of the firm to reach its goals, or expected 
results, and for this reason they are interested in how the company is managed and controlled. 
Discussion is often focused on the effects of Corporate Governance mechanisms on economic 
efficiency, with an emphasis of shareholders’ interests protection. In public companies 
characterized by a separation of ownership and control, Corporate Governance should be designed 
to solve the principal-agent problems by trying to align the interests of the two parties and design an 
effective control system to ensure that the Board of Directors acts respecting shareholders’ rights. 
This latest issue is of great relevance in the recent debate on regulatory policies: in the last decade, a 
renewed interest has raised towards Corporate Governance as a results of sensational defaults in 
2001-2002, some of which due to financial frauds, and especially after the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. 
In fact, the various scandals of different nature have brought corporate Governance issues not only 
to the attention of regulators and policy makers, but also to the public opinion, thus increasing 
pressure on firms to improve their governance and disclosure mechanisms. The greatest push 
towards better Corporate Governance probably comes from institutional investors, who these days 
often, if not always, include Corporate Governance quality in their investments selection criteria. 
The first evidence that institutional investors consider Corporate Governance parameters in their 
investment decisions come from the Global Investor Opinion Survey of more than 200 institutional 
investors in 31 countries, published by McKinsey and the Global Corporate Governance Forum in 
2002. 
Later studies, published by the magazines Fortune and BusinessWeek, have confirmed these 
evidences.  
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The relationships between Corporate Governance and firms value and between Corporate 
Governance and firms performances feed an important stream of scientific research, where our 
work finds place.  
The contribution of our study is mainly the design of a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) that can 
be used to measure the quality of Corporate Governance systems in different countries. In fact, most 
studies use data which is characteristic of a single country; to our best knowledge, the only previous 
study which analyses multiple countries is the one conducted by Klapper and Love (2004); while 
they focus on emerging countries, our study analyses Corporate Governance systems in the largest 
firms in mature markets. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature on Corporate Governance is vast and still expanding. 
In the years 2000, authors began to investigate the relationship between different discretional 
governance mechanisms and firms value. The main variables used in the first studies include 
ownership structure and concentration, the market for corporate control (M&A and hostile 
takeovers), managers compensation and incentives schemes, the number of board members and 
board composition (in terms of incidence of independent members) (Gupta, et al., 2009).  
More recently, scholars have started to investigate the impact of Corporate Governance on firm 
value using more comprehensive measures than a single governance mechanism or specific 
variables. For this purposes, several indexes have been proposed to measure the quality of 
Corporate Governance systems adopted by firms.  
One of the first studies in this direction is the one by Patel and Dallas (2002). They investigate 
transparency and disclosure of the main global firms by using the T&D ranking, an index composed 
of 98 questions grouped in three categories: “ownership structure and investor rights”, “financial 
transparency and information disclosure”, and “board and management structure and process”. 
They find that firms with a higher value of the index have a lower market risk and higher price-to-
book value, therefore firms should improve disclosure and transparency in order to lower their cost 
of equity.  
Gompers et al. (2003) are the first authors to build a comprehensive index able to evaluate 
Corporate Governance in all its aspects. Their G-Index is composed of 24 distinct Corporate 
Governance provisions and grouped in 5 categories, all related to anti-takeover defence. The index 
measures the practices limiting shareholders rights, therefore to higher values of the index 
correspond worse governance systems. The authors investigate the relationship between G and 
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firms performances for a sample of 1500 listed firms in the period 1990 to 1999 and find that G is 
strongly correlated with stock performances, Tobin’s Q, net profit margin and sales growth, while 
the correlation with ROE is not significant. Therefore they argue that firms with better shareholders 
rights have higher valuations, higher sales growth and lower capital expenditures. 
Core et al. (2006) criticise these results, arguing that it is not true that a better governance 
determines higher extra-returns, and that in other periods this relationship is inverted: firms with 
poor governance have low operating performances, but higher extra-returns if compared with firms 
with better governance. They believe that the extra-returns documented by Gompers et al. (2003) 
are specific of the period of their study. 
An approach similar to Gompers et al. (2003) is employed by Bauer and Günster (2004), who 
analyse firms of the FTSE Eurotop 300 index in 2000 and 2001 using the “Deminor Corporate 
Governance Ratings”, an index composed of 300 criteria grouped in four categories: “Rights and 
Duties of Shareholders”, “Range of Takeover Defences”, “Disclosure on Corporate Governance” 
and “Board Structure and Functioning”. Contrary to Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer and Günster 
(2004) find a negative but insignificant relationship between the Corporate Governance standards 
and firm performances measured by the net profit margin and the return on equity.  
In 2008, Bauer et al. replicate the study for Japanese firms and find that, after adjusting for market 
risk, dimension and book-to-market effect, a portfolio composed of well-governed firms obtains an 
extra-return of 15% higher than a portfolio made of bad-governed firms. More in details, 
investigating the relationship between six categories of governance variables and stock 
performance, the authors find that only financial transparency, internal controls, shareholders’ rights 
and compensation schemes have a significant impact on financial performances on the Japanese 
market. 
Another study which moves from the results of Gompers et al. (2003) is the one performed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2008), who identify a subset of the 24 governance practices composing the G-index 
which are significantly correlated with value. The authors build an “Entrenchment index” (E-index) 
using only 6 variables which are correlated with Tobin’s Q and demonstrate that an increase in the 
index value (which corresponds to worse governance performances) is associated with sensibly 
negative extra-returns in the period from 1990 to 2003. They show that the remaining 18 variables 
are not correlated with firm value. The authors argue against complex indexes which use a large 
number of variables, because many of them may not be correlated with value, or they are 
determined by other variables. They go further explaining that such complex indexes which include 
variables not correlated with value may be wrong measures of the quality of governance and that 
using them may induce firms to adopt counter-productive governance mechanisms.  
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While the studies conducted by Gompers et al. (2003) and by Bebchuk et al. (2008) use only 
variables connected to anti-takeover practices (external governance), the Gov-Score index designed 
by Brown and Caylor (2006) includes variables regarding both internal and external governance 
practices, grouped in eight categories: “audit”, “board of directors”, “charter/bylaws”, “director 
education”, “executive and director compensation”, “ownership”, “progressive practices” and 
“state of incorporation”. The authors find that the Gov-Score is positively and significantly 
correlated with the firm value measured by Tobin’s Q for a sample of 1868 US firms in 2002. They 
also find that not all the variables are equally significant, thus supporting the argument that the 
governance practices really impacting on firm value are few, as proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2008). 
Brown and Caylor (2006) and Bebchuk et al. (2008) agree on the identification of two governance 
practices which are correlated to firm value: “no poison pill” and “no staggered board”. Brown and 
Caylor (2006) demonstrate that their results are robust, not affected by endogeneity or reverse 
causality and that their index is more correlated to value than the entrenchment index created by 
Bebchuk et al. (2008). 
The studies already illustrated rely on proprietary data which are not publicly available; on the 
contrary, the Report on Business (ROB), published by Globe and Mail in October 2002, calculates 
governance scores using an aggregated index for firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and 
make them freely available. A number of empirical studies use the ROB as a measure of the quality 
of Corporate Governance, thus investigating the relationship between Corporate Governance and 
value for the Canadian market. One of the first studies in this sense is proposed by Foester and 
Huen (2004), who find that in the short term Corporate Governance is important for Canadian 
investors: the market reacts to the news about governance ranking in a way which is statistically 
significant. The Corporate Governance is relevant also in the long term, but only after adjusting for 
risk and only if the period considered is sufficiently long. 
An important contribution comes from the work of Drobetz et al. (2004), who investigate the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and value on the German market, using a 
multidimensional Corporate Governance rating (CGR) based on answers to a questionnaire. They 
find that CGR is strongly and positively correlated with firm value and negatively correlated with 
stock returns, thus confirming the results obtained by Gompers et al. (2003). They also prove that 
an investment strategy which buys firms with high values of CGR and short-sells firms with low 
values of CGR firms earns abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample 
period. However, Drobetz et al. (2004) use cross-sectional data and are unable to solve issues 
connected to endogeneity or reverse-causality. 
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Following Drobetz et al. (2004), Cheung et al. (2007) build a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
based on publicly available information and use it to investigate the relationship between Corporate 
Governance and value for the 168 largest firms listed on the Hong Kong market. They find that to 
higher values of the CGI correspond higher market-to-book values, a proxy of firm value. 
Black et al. (2003) and later Black et al. (2006) find the same result for the Korean market; their 
contribution is particularly relevant because their study is one of the rare cases in which the 
endogeneity problem is solved with the use of instruments, and the authors prove the causality of 
the relationship. The identification of proper instruments has always been a great concern for 
scholars investigating the relationship between Corporate Governance and value; Black et al. (2003, 
2006) are able to find an appropriate instrument by exploiting the peculiarities of the Korean 
market, but their solution cannot be replicated in other markets. 
A different solution to endogeneity problems is provided by Beiner et al. (2005). They build a 
Corporate Governance index for Switzerland and analyse the impact of different governance 
mechanisms on firm value. In order to consider the inter-relation of the six different mechanisms 
they have identified, the authors use a set of seven equations solved simultaneously, where the 
dependent variables are the different governance mechanism in six cases, and Tobin’s Q in the 
seventh case. They find a positive and significant correlation between Corporate Governance and 
Tobin’s Q. 
The 2002 ROB ratings are used also in Klein et al. (2005), who investigate the effect of ownership 
concentration on the correlation between the Corporate Governance score and firm value for a 
sample of 263 Canadian firms. They find that not all governance dimensions are significant and that 
the effects are different for different ownership structures; they also find that the aggregate measure 
is not correlated with value, regardless of ownership concentration. In particular, the authors do not 
find any relationship between the Board composition and independence – a variable with a 
considerable weight (40%) in the aggregate index - and firm value. Instead, they find that strong 
shareholders rights, proper compensations plans and a transparent disclosure are appreciated by 
investors. Supporting the thesis suggested by previous studies (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Dutta 
and Jog, 2004; Park and Shin, 2004), they conclude that firm value is not affected by Board 
composition and structure. 
The most recent study employing ROB scores is performer by Gupta et al. (2009). However, they 
do not find any significant correlation between value or firm performances and the aggregate index 
or any sub-index, with the only exception of the relationship between value, measured both by 
Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio, and “Board and CEO compensation score”, which is 
negatively correlated with value, thus confirming the results obtained by Klein et al. (2005). The 
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authors point out that ROB scores may not be true indicators of the quality of Corporate 
Governance, and that the effect of governance on value may be expressed in a longer period of 
time, thus requiring longer time series to be properly investigated. 
Additional contradictory arguments are provided by Bhagat and Bolton (2008), who claim that a 
better Corporate Governance as measured by the G-Index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) or by 
the E-Index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2008) is positively correlated with better 
contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance, thus confirming the results obtained by 
Gompers et al. (2003), but not with future stock market performance, contradicting previous 
findings. They argue that the different results of the investigations of different authors on this 
relationship depend on whether or not they take into account the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between governance and stock performances. 
 
3 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
The review of the literature highlights that many empirical studies focus on the relationship between 
a single governance variable and firms’ value. For example, Yermack (1996) uses only the 
dimension of the Board, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) its 
composition, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use block-holders’ participations, Gompers et al. (2003) use 
anti take-over mechanisms. On the contrary, we believe that Corporate Governance is a complex 
phenomenon and, as such, it should be measured by a multi-dimensional variable. 
For this reason, in order to assess the quality of the Corporate Governance systems implemented by 
firms, we build the Corporate Governance Index (CGI), which is composed of 39 variables 
belonging to 4 categories: Board of Directors, Compensation, Shareholders’ rights, Disclosure. 
The variables are chosen based on the recommendations of the Corporate Governance codes of 5 
countries and with the intention of being of general applicability, therefore any criteria specific of 
the regulation in a given country has been excluded. 
The codes which have been analysed are the following: 
─ Code de Gouvernement D’Enterprise des Sociétés Cotées (FRA) 
─ Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (JAP) 
─ Combined Code (UK) 
─ Codice di Autodisciplina (ITA) 
─ NACD Key Agreed Principles (USA) 
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Each variable can have a value comprised between 0 (worst governance practice) and 1 (best 
governance practice), therefore all variables have the same weight.  
The index is calculated by adding the values of all the variables and normalising the sum to 100 in 
order to express CGI as a percentage. The value of the CGI for a firm is therefore comprised 
between 0 and 100. 
4 VARIABLES 
In order to investigate the relationship between the quality of the Corporate Governance systems as 
measured by the CGI and firms’ value, an econometric model is implemented with firms’ value as 
dependent variable and CGI as independent variable. 
The measure we choose for firms’ value is Tobin Q defined as (Market Cap + Liabilities + 
Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. 
The model includes other independent variables that are reported in previous studies to influence 
firms’ value. 
Firm size 
Following several authors, including Bauer and Günster (2004), Bebchuk et al. (2008), Beiner et al. 
(2005), Black et al. (2006) Brown and Caylor (2006), Bubbico et al. (2012), Drobetz et al. (2004), 
Gompers et al. (2003), Klein et al. (2005), we use the natural log of assets as a measure of firm size. 
Firm size may be positively correlated with value because of economies of scale, or negatively 
correlated with firm size because of organisational inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 1966) or worse 
agency problems (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
Firm age 
Following Aboav et al. (2010), Gompers et al. (2003) and Shin and Stulz (2000), we include the 
number of years passed after firm’s IPO to accounts for firm’s age. Drobetz et al. (2004) argue that 
companies listed more recently have higher growth rates and therefore better governance 
mechanisms and performances. We expect a negative coefficient for this variable.  
Growth 
Another variable that previous studies, such as Aboav et al. (2010), Beiner et al. (2005), Black et al. 
(2006) and Yermack (1996), have included in the model, is growth. We therefore include annual 
sales growth.  
 
 
9 
 
Operating performances 
Following Aboav et al. (2010), Bebchuk et al. (2008), Beiner et al. (2005), Black et al. (2006), 
Bubbico et al. (2012), Daines (2001), Gupta et al. (2009) and Yermack (1996), we include ROA as 
a measure of operating performances and we expect it to be positively correlated with value. We 
perform robustness check with alternative measures such as EBIT/Sales and Capex/Assets to 
measure operating performances and growth opportunities respectively.  
Floating shares 
Following Beiner et al. (2005) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008), we include the percentage of floating 
shares to account for the ownership structure, which is expected to be correlated with value as well 
as with governance quality. The sign of the relationship between the ownership structure and value 
is not clear; the presence of a large shareholder is reported to impact negatively, due to low minority 
shareholders’ protection, by Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004); on the 
contrary, according to the “monitoring hypothesis” advanced by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the 
higher concentrations favours better monitoring, with a positive effect on value.  
Leverage 
Following Black et al. (2003), Drobetz et al. (2004) and Klein (2005), we include leverage because 
several theoretical and empirical previous studies show its relationship with firm value.  
Jensen (1986, 1993), Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) suggest that debt discourages 
managers from over-investing the free cash flows and improves performance thanks to the 
monitoring exercised on managers by the banks. 
However, the effect on debt seems to vary according to other conditions, such as the availability of 
profitable investment opportunities. McConnell and Servaes (1995) empirically find that leverage is 
positively correlated with value for firms with poor investment opportunities, confirming that debt 
solves the problem of excessive investments. Anyway, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et 
al. (2004) do not find any relationship between leverage and firms’ performances and argue that 
leverage is used at its best in conjunction with other governance mechanisms. Jensen (1986) argues 
that mature firms with stable cash flows should use more debt in order to discipline managers, but 
for firms with high growth opportunities debt service limits the ability of the management to pursue 
profitable investments, thus creating an “underinvestment” issue (Myers, 1977), which has a 
negative effect on value. 
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5 DATA ANALYSIS  
5.1 SAMPLE 
The original sample we choose is made of the 20 firms with the highest market capitalisation in 
each of the 5 countries analysed: France (Euronext), Italy (Borsa Italiana, part of the LSE group), 
Japan (Tokyo Stock Exchange), UK (London Stock Exchange) and USA (Nasdaq and New York 
Stock Exchange).  
For each firm we collect Corporate Governance data for three years, 2009, 2010 and 2011, thus 
obtaining panel data, and calculate the CGI. Governance data is obtained from publicly available 
documents such as the “proxy statement” and the “form-20” for the US firms, the “document de 
référence” for French firms, the “annual report” and the “notice of shareholders meeting” for 
British firms and for Japan, and the “Report di Corporate Governance” for Italian firms. 
Data source for all other variables data is Bloomberg, except for the years from IPO for which the 
source is Datastream. 
From the original sample of 100 firms, 4 firms (China Southern Airlines, China Mobile Hong 
Kong, Royal Dutch Shell and Petroleo Brasileiro) are excluded because data is not available in 
Bloomberg, and 1 firm (Fanuc) is excluded because data on Corporate Governance is not available. 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. reports the main descriptive statistics of the CGI 
for the sample firms in the 5 countries for the period 2009-2011.  
 
 
CGI Average Min Q1 Median Q3 Max St. Dev 
Total 65.297 35.557 56.201 67.580 74.388 87.612 12.722 
France 69.307 56.427 65.746 69.283 73.765 83.650 6.0303 
Italy 56.651 37.606 51.259 55.961 61.971 74.453 8.1777 
Japan 52.184 35.557 41.665 51.923 62.645 75.098 11.071 
UK 76.189 44.674 72.119 79.986 83.218 87.612 10.410 
USA 73.047 62.483 69.216 73.507 76.457 84.308 5.3876 
Table 1 - Statistics for CGI in France, Italy, Japan, UK and USA (2009-2011) 
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5.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUE 
To investigate the relationship between Corporate Governance, as measured by the CGI, and the 
firm value, we perform four different econometric analysis. 
First, we apply an OLS model to cross-sectional data for each of the three years 2009, 2010 and 
2011. We find that variables are correlated with the residuals, thus violating one of the basic 
assumptions of the linear regression model. We conclude that OLS estimates are unreliable and we 
do not report them. 
Second, in order to tackle the endogeneity problem, we apply a two-stage least squares model 
(TSLS) using the percentage of independent board members, a well accepted proxy of good 
governance, as instrumental variable. We recall that proper instruments should be significant and 
exogenous: they must be correlated with the replaced variables and uncorrelated with the model 
error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 . In our case, we use the Wald test to prove that the instruments are significant, but we 
fail to identify additional instruments to investigate whether the chosen instrumental variable is 
exogenous. We proceed to estimate a TSLS model, but the poor results of the Hausman test do not 
support the hypothesis that TSLS estimates are better than OLS. As we cannot prove that all 
instruments are exogenous, we consider TSLS results unreliable and do not report them. 
Third, we analyse the data for the three years together, applying data panel techniques. In particular, 
first we apply Pooled OLS regression, Fixed Effects (FE) model and Random Effects (RE) model, 
then we use a WLS estimator because of the persistence of heteroskedasticity. Panel data results are 
reported in the next section. 
Finally, we eliminate unimportant components of the CGI index using the Wald test and identify a 
reduced CGI with only 12 variables  and use it to replace CGI in the WLS regression, obtaining a 
positive and strongly significant correlation between Tobin’s Q and reduced CGI. 
 
5.3 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
Our data is longitudinal, that is it is characterised by a large number of individuals N and a small 
number of periods T. In this cases, the econometric model should focus on the heterogeneity among 
individuals, eventually cleaning from the effects of time which are common to all individuals.  
Therefore, to analyse panel data we start from the general equation 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
and use three different models: Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE), which 
use different assumptions on the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , while the coefficients vector 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is invariant. 
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The Pooled OLS model can be written as 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 e 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜷𝜷  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝜷𝜷 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
It assumes that the intercept and the regressors coefficients are constant over time and across firms, 
while the differences among firms are captured by the error term. 
The FE model, which considers the intercept varying across firms (one way), while the slope is 
constant, can be written as follow: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  e 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜷𝜷  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜷𝜷 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
Finally, in the RE model the intercept varies across firms and time (two-ways), while the slope is 
constant. It can be written as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  +  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  e 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜷𝜷  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜷𝜷 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
5.3.1 POOLED 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6
∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽8 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽9 ∙  𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽10 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖_𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽11 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇)𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13 ∙ 𝐽𝐽_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽14 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽15 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
 
This model ignores the differences among firms and time and uses an OLS estimator on all the 
observations. Given the results of the cross-sectional analysis, we expect from the pooled regression 
significant coefficients and a good R2, but very low levels of the Durbin-Watson test, indicating the 
presence of autocorrelation or an incorrect specification of the model. 
The output results reported in Table 2 confirm our expectations. In fact, some coefficients are 
significant, R2 (0.62125) is acceptable, but Durbin-Watson statistics is low (0.419514). 
This model ignores the panel structure using restrictive hypothesis, but it is to be recalled that N 
individual observations for T periods are not the same as NT different individuals. Instead, 
considering the panel structure of the data allows to decompose the variability into two components, 
one due to time and referred to as “within”, and one due to heterogeneity among individuals, 
referred to as “between”. 
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5.3.2 INTERCEPT VARYING ACROSS INDIVIDUALS (ONE-WAY): FE AND RE MODELS 
𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛼𝛼 + �( 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 ∙  𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 )94
𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽4
∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽5 ∙  𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖_𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽7 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽9 ∙ 𝐽𝐽_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽10 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
This model allows to consider the variability among firms by allowing the intercept to vary for the 
different individuals, while keeping the regressors coefficients constant. The intercept is modelled 
as 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  has to be investigated. 
Two cases are possible: 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  can be deterministic or stochastic. In the first case we apply a Fixed 
Effects model (FE), in the second case a Random Effects model (RE). 
 
5.3.3 INTERCEPT VARYING ACROSS INDIVIDUALS (ONE-WAY): FE MODEL 
The FE model eliminates the individual characteristics (μi) using the so called within 
transformation (or fixed effect transformation), which regresses (yit −  yi) against (xit −  xi), where,  
in our case, yit  is Tobin’s Q, while xi are the averages of the variables during the three time periods.  
In the FE model we use an estimator which is robust for the covariance matrix. Given that panel 
data has characteristics common to time series and to cross-section, in general it should be expected 
 Model: Pooled OLS,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Const 1.95451 0.830220 2.354 0.0193 ** 
l_Assets -0.0404045 0.0141991 -2.846 0.0048 *** 
l_Age 0.0639278 0.0372334 1.717 0.0871 * 
ROA 11.5600 0.664259 17.40 2.42e-46 *** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0418098 0.0132396 3.158 0.0018 *** 
Growth 0.168112 0.325133 0.5171 0.6055 
Floating -0.265421 0.155375 -1.708 0.0887 * 
l_CGI -0.0309536 0.170070 -0.1820 0.8557 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.621250 Adj R-squared 0.611678 
F(7, 277) 64.90749 P-value (F) 8.62e-55 
Rho 0.808087 Durbin-Watson 0.419514 
Table 2 - Pooled OLS model 
14 
 
that the robust estimate of the covariance matrix should deal with heteroskedasticity and with 
autocorrelation (HAC approach). Additional points of attention include the possibility that the 
variance of the error term varies among cross-sectional units and that the covariance of the errors 
among the units can be not null in a given period. 
We therefore use the estimator suggested by Arellano, which of data with large N and small T, like 
in our case, is HAC. Arellano estimator is 
� =
𝐼𝐼
�  (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1  ×  �(𝑋𝑋′ 𝑖𝑖  𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖  𝑢𝑢�′𝑖𝑖   𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) × (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖=1  
where X is the regressors matrix, 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖  is the residuals vector for the unit i, and n is the number of 
cross-sectional units. The output of the FE model is depicted in Table 3. 
The same results can be obtained with the Least-Squared Dummy Variable regression model 
(LSDV), which we apply by introducing 94 dummy variables (for 95 observations), one for each 
firm except for one firm, Wells Fargo, which is considered as the base case intercepts are referred 
to. LSDV results are provided in the Appendix, Tables I and II. 
LSDV gives an improved R2 (0.935102) and a higher Durbin-Watson statistics (1.385729). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Fixed-effects model 
 Model: FE,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Robust std err (HAC) 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const 13.5606 7.82849 1.732 0.0849 * 
l_Assets -0.479993 0.299313 -1.604 0.1105 
l_Age 0.0525902 0.165929 0.3169 0.7516 
ROA 3.54808 1.71803 2.065 0.0403 ** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0638691 0.0333923 1.913 0.0573 * 
Growth 0.0828064 0.194636 0.4254 0.6320 
Floating -0.237868 0.201694 0.1567 0.8756 
l_CGI 0.0316125 0.201694 0.1567 0.8756 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.935102 Adj R-squared 0.899283 
F(101, 183) 26.10681 P-value (F) 2.67e-72 
Rho -0.204721 Durbin-Watson 1.385729 
 
Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 183) = 9.41485,  with p-value = P(F(94, 183) > 9.41485) = 1.28526e-37 
 
Wald test for heteroskedasticity 
Null hp: units have error variance in common 
Asymp stats test: Chi-square (95) = 1.9176e+10,  with p-value = 0 
15 
 
Although the FE and the LSDV models give always the same numerical results, an advantage given 
by LSDV is that with this model it is possible to obtain the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  for each firm, while FE reports a 
single intercept, which is usually the average of all the individual 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 .  
The constant terms 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  capture the effect of variables varying from firm to firm, but are time 
invariant; the within estimator therefore considers only heterogeneity among different individuals 
(within), but not heterogeneity in the same individual in different periods of time (between). An 
evident limit of this approach is that it is not possible to include in the model regressor with a value 
constant over time for an individual such as, for example, the industry. 
It is interesting to notice that in our model the coefficients of the first 20 dummy variables, 
corresponding to the French firms, are significant with a 5% confidence level and their effect could 
be captured by a single country dummy variable, thus reducing the number of variables used in the 
model.  
The test in Table 3 reports that the use of the robust estimator is not sufficient to eliminate 
heteroskedasticity. For this reason, we apply the method of the Weighted Least Squares (WLS), 
whose results are summarized in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - WLS model 
 
 Model: WLS,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Weights based on unit error variance 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Const 1.59798 0.232695 6.867 4.30e-11 *** 
l_Assets -0.0337498 0.00489815 -6.890 3.75e-11 *** 
l_Age 0.0574554 0.0125529 4.577 7.13e-06 *** 
ROA 10.1264 0.334275 30.29 6.61e-90 *** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0236623 0.00450021 5.258 2.91e-07 *** 
Growth -0.0362783 0.0928283 -0.3908 0.6962 
Floating -0.0990942 0.0433952 -2.284 0.0232 ** 
l_CGI -0.00915840 0.0486073 0.1884 0.8507 
 
 
Statistics based on weighted data 
R-squared 0.862971 Adj R-squared 0.859509 
F(2, 277) 249.2109 P-value (F) 1.4e-115 
 
Statistics based on original data 
Average dep var 1.495459 st dev dep var 0.816459 
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5.3.4 FE MODEL VS. RE MODEL 
The Random Effects model (RE) treats individual effects as part of the error term, as stochastic 
components uncorrelated with regressors. It is therefore possible to include in the matrix X 
variables that vary between different individuals, although they remain constant within the same 
individual; this is not possible with the FE model.  
The most appropriate model to describe the relationship between Corporate Governance and firm 
value can be chosen with the aid of three statistical tests, reported in Table 5. The first test 
investigates the presence of significant individual effects; in our case, the p-value is very low 
(1.28886e-35) and the null hypothesis - the absence of combined significance of the group averages 
– is rejected. For this reason, the FE model is considered more appropriate than the Pooled OLS 
regression. 
The Breusch-Pagan test is used to compare the RE model with the OLS pooled. Also in this case the 
p-value is very low (3.13866e-27), favouring the RE model. 
Finally, the Hausman (or Durbin-Wu-Hausman) test compares the FE and the RE models and its 
results indicate that the FE model is more appropriate to describe the phenomenon under 
investigation.  
Before analysing the results of the FE model, we verify if heterogeneity due to time should also be 
considered, along with fixed effects. We therefore include dummy variables to investigate 
differences in the intercepts due to time. 
As expected due to the very low differences in CGI average values for the three years, we find that 
there are not significant differences between the time periods. In fact, the coefficients of the two 
dummy variables are not significant and, performing the Wald test, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of combined significance of the two dummy variables (Table 6).  
These final results confirm that the FE model is appropriate to describe the relationship between 
CGI and firms’ value, as illustrated in the next section. 
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Table 5 – tests for the choice of the appropriate model 
 Diagnosis: hp of balanced panel with 95 cross-section units for 3 periods 
 
Fixed-effects estimator 
Allows different intercept for each cross-section unit 
Std err of slope in round brackets, p-value in square brackets 
 
Const 13.561 (4.4107) [0.00243] 
l_Assets -0.47999 (0.17861) [0.00787] 
l_Age 0.05259 (0.27344) [0.84770] 
ROA 3.5481 (0.98546) [0.00013] 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.063869 (0.028146) [0.02442] 
Growth 0.082806 (0.20644) [0.68909] 
Floating -0.23787 (0.27657) [0.39088] 
l_CGI 0.031612 (0.28616) [0.91216] 
 
95 group averages have been subtracted from data 
 
Residuals variance: 12.2863 / (285 – 102) = 0.0671384 
Combined significance of different averages in groups: 
F (94, 183) = 9.41485,  with p-value  1.28526e-37 
(a low p-value rejects the hp that pooled OLD model is appropriate, in favour of FE) 
 
Breusch-Pagan test 
LM = 110.078,  with p-value = prob (chi-square (1) > 110.078) = 9.42314e-26 
(a low p-value rejects the hp that pooled OLS model is appropriate, in favour of RE) 
 
Variance estimators: 
   Between = 0.201557 
   Within = 0.0671384 
 Theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.666784 
 
Random-effects estimator 
Allows different error term for each unit 
Std err of slope in round brackets, p-value in square brackets 
 
Const 2.5688 (1.0652) [0.01654] 
l_Assets -0.075253 (0.021533) [0.00055] 
l_Age 0.080494 (0.058586) [0.17057] 
ROA 7.5345 (0.73898) [0.00000] 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.032172 (0.017666) [0.06967] 
Growth 0.01409 (0.21148) [0.94693] 
Floating -0.1355 (0.19102) [0.47870] 
l_CGI 0.060744 (0.20456) [0.76672] 
 
Hausman test: 
H = 54.6344,  with p-value = prob (chi-square (7) > 0.54.6344) = 1.76146e-09 
(a low p-value rejects the hp that RE is appropriate, in favour of FE) 
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Table 6 - FE model with time dummy variables 
 
5.3.5 FE RESULTS 
The results of the WLS model (Table 4) brings the following considerations. 
The variable which has the highest effect on firms value is ROA: its coefficient is positive and high 
(10.1264), with p-value much lower than 1% (6.61e-90). This confirms, as we expected, that 
operating performances are highly relevant for investors.  
Other variables which have a positive and significant correlation with value are the natural 
logarithm of years from IPO (coefficient: 0.0575, p-value: 7.13e-06) and leverage (coefficient: 
0.0237, p-value: 2.91e-07), this latter result being coherent with the findings in Jensen (1986), Stulz 
(1990) and Hart and Moore (1995), who argue that debt can create value through an improved 
monitoring on management exercised by banks and the reduction of the free cash flows employed 
in unprofitable investments.  
 Model: FE,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Robust std err (HAC) 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Const 10.2658 7.17463 1.431 0.1542 
l_Assets -0.408688 0.279289 -1.463 0.1451 
l_Age 0.420594 0.349102 1.205 0.2299 
ROA 3.95032 1.85382 2.131 0.0344
 ** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0620889 0.0360549 1.722 0.0868 * 
Growth 0.104956 0.204766 0.5126 0.6089 
Floating -0.272276 0.502466 -0.5419 0.5886  
l_CGI 0.103372 0.188444 0.5486 0.5840 
dt_2 -0.0559186 0.0481140 -1.162 0.2467 
dt_3 -0.0901423 0.0575925 -1.565 0.1193 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.935926 Adj R-squared 0.899464 
F(101, 183) 25.66861 P-value (F) 2.29e-71 
Rho -0.209918 Durbin-Watson 1.393454 
 
Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 181) = 9.33256,  with p-value = P(F(94, 181) > 9.33256) = 4.30736e-37 
 
Wald test for combined significance of time dummies 
Asymp test statistics: chi-square (2) = 2.67425  with p-value = 0.2626 
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The only negative and highly significant variable (99% confidence level, p-value  < 1%) is the firm 
dimension as measured by the natural logarithm of assets (coefficient: -0.0337, p-value: 3.75e-11); 
the negative effects of the organisational inefficiencies suggested by Leibenstein (1966) appears 
more relevant than the positive effects due to the economies of scale suggested by Baumol (1959).  
The Floating coefficient is also negative, but less significant (95% confidence level; p-value: 
0.0232) 
The coefficient of the Growth variable, measured by the average annual sales growth, is negative 
but not significant. 
Finally, the coefficient of the natural logarithm of CGI, the variable measuring the quality of 
Corporate Governance systems adopted by firms, is low and positive (0.0092), but not significant, 
with p-value equal to 0.8507. This finding can be interpreted in one of the two following ways: 
i. The Corporate Governance is not correlated with firm value 
ii. The CGI is not a proper measure to evaluate the quality of the Corporate Governance from 
investors’ perspective. 
 
We proceed to investigate if it is possible to identify a subset of the 39 governance variables used to 
build the CGI which are correlated with firms value. 
 
 
5.4 REDUCED CGI 
In order to identify the variables which are most correlated with value, we estimate a linear 
regression model where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and the CGI as dependent variable is 
replaced by its 39 components; the other independent variables of the previous model are also 
included: ln(Asset), ln(Age), ROA, Debt to Equity, Growth and Floating. The output of the Pooled 
OLS and the FE models with the 39 governance variables is shown in the Appendix, Tables III, IV 
and V. Also in this case, FE is deemed the most appropriate model. 
We use a testing-down approach and find that the Wald test indicates that the variables with a 
negative coefficient in the FE model are unimportant and can be omitted, therefore we eliminate 
these variables and estimated the model again (Tables VI and VII in the Appendix). The procedure 
is repeated for the variables with negative coefficients in this second estimates; the Wald test allows 
again to eliminate such variables. The result of this process is the identification of 12 relevant 
variables, which are used to compose the reduced CGI, or CGI_12, which is then used in the 
regression, whose output is shown in the Appendix in Table VIII.  
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It is interesting to notice that the 12 variables still represent all of the original 4 macro areas: 
variable 1-6 refer to the Board area, variable 7 to compensation, variables 8-11 to Shareholders’ 
rights and variable 12 to Disclosure, thus confirming our hypothesis that Corporate Governance is a 
complex phenomenon and should be measured by a multi-dimensional index. 
The FE model is applied using the reduced CGI, made of 12 variables (Table 6); also in this case, 
the robust estimator is not able to eliminate the heteroskedasticity, thus requiring the use of the 
WLS estimator, whose output is reported in Table 8. The output of the WLS model using the 
reduced CGI is coherent with the previous results obtained using the complete CGI (Table 4), as the 
signs and the significance of the coefficients of the control variables are preserved, and the R2 is 
still high (88.1%). In addition, using the reduced CGI, the coefficient of the variable l_CGI 
becomes strongly significant, with p-value equal to 0.0003, as expected.  
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 Model: FE,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Robust std err (HAC) 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const 14.5968 7.10839 2.053 0.0415 ** 
l_Assets -0.536437 0.285228 -1.881 0.0616 * 
l_Age 0.0224268 0.159639 0.1405 0.8884 
ROA 3.62420 1.67263 2.167 0.0315 ** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0600735 0.0283717 2.117 0.0356 ** 
Growth 0.0899109 0.192840 0.4662 0.6416 
Floating -0.393546 0.528584 -0.7445 0.4575 
l_CGI 0.398815 0.192571 2.071 0.0398 ** 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.937069 Adj R-squared 0.902336 
F(101, 183) 26.97955 P-value (F) 1.77e-73 
Rho -0.222156 Durbin-Watson 1.416912 
 
Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 183) = 9.68836,  with p-value = P(F(94, 183) > 9.68836) = 1.81634e-38 
 
Wald test for heteroskedasticity 
Null hp: units have error variance in common 
Asymp stats test: Chi-square (95) = 1.2.77967e+06,  with p-value = 0 
 Model: WLS,  Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Weights based on unit error variance 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const 1.51577 0.129348 11.72 5.00e-26 *** 
l_Assets -0.0376355 0.00486135 -7.742 1.85e-13 *** 
l_Age 0.0674218 0.0121588 5.545 6.85e-08 *** 
ROA 10.1048 0.337421 29.95 7.61e-89 *** 
DEBT_TO_EQY 0.0287139 0.00359160 7.995 3.54e-14 *** 
Growth -0.0156248 0.0858647 -0.1820 0.8557 
Floating -0.179490 0.0484463 -3.705 0.0003 *** 
l_CGI 0.121311 0.0334525 3.626 0.0003 *** 
 
Statistics based on weighted data 
R-squared 0.881008 Adj R-squared 0.878001 
F(2, 277) 292.9848 P-value (F) 4.7e-124 
 
Statistics based on original data 
Average dep var 1.495459 st dev dep var 0.816459 
Table 7 - FE model, reduced CGI (12 parameters) 
Table 8 - WLS model, reduced CGI (12 parameters) 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of the present work is to investigate the relationship between the quality of Corporate 
Governance systems adopted by firms and their value, and to answer o the question Are firms 
which adopt better Corporate Governance systems, all else equal, have a higher market value? 
While most of the previous studies focus on a country, our study analyses and measures the 
Corporate Governance in five different countries, namely France, Italy, Japan, UK and USA. 
As a measure of the quality of Corporate Governance, we build the Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI), a scoring model based on 39 variables grouped in 4 macro-areas: Board, Shareholders’ 
rights, Compensation, Disclosure. 
The original sample is made of 100 firms, 20 in each if the 5 countries, then reduced to 95 for a lack 
of data of 5 firms, observed for 3 years, from 2009 to 2011. 
Statistical analysis based on average scores shows that the most advanced countries in terms of 
Corporate Governance are UK and USA. In addition, it has to be noted that the average score is 
following an increasing trend in all the 5 countries. 
One of the strengths of our research is the use of panel data, which allows more robust analysis. 
Typical Panel data techniques allow to considerably reduce the omitted variables issue, which is 
very common with cross-sectional data. A confirmation to this statement comes from the data 
analysis presented in the paper. First, we estimate OLS models for each of the three years and find 
incoherent results over time. A possible explanation is an endogeneity nature of the governance 
variable. We them estimate a TSLS model, using the percentage of independent board members as 
an instrumental variable. However, the poor results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman do not confirm is 
appropriate for this analysis. Finally we analyse the data as panel, using the Pooled OLS, Fixed-
Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) estimators. Three different specification tests, including 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman’s test, indicate the FE model as the most appropriate model to 
represent this data. The results do not confirm a correlation between CGI and Tobin’s Q (the 
coefficient is positive but not significant). 
The last part of the study focuses on the search of a subset of the 39 governance variables 
composing the CGI which are positively correlated with value in a statistically significant way. 
Applying omit tests (Wald tests), we identify 12 variables that are strongly correlated with value, 
and use them to compose a reduced CGI.  
Our study confirms the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2008), who argue that only some aspects of 
Corporate Governance impact on value; It is interesting to note that, differently from Bebchuk et al. 
(2008), the 12 variables we find belong to all the 4 areas originally considered in the CGI: Board, 
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Compensation, Shareholders’ rights and Disclosure. This results confirm our belief that Corporate 
Governance is complex and requires a multi-dimensional measure.  
We conclude by offering some considerations for future developments. 
First of all, our sample is made of only the largest 20 firms in the five markets we have considered, 
and cannot be considered representative of all the listed firms. Extending the study to include a 
larger number of firms with different sizes can increase generalizability. 
In addition, increasing the number of periods included in the analysis will allow to consider also 
dynamic panel analysis. 
Finally, the search for appropriate instrument variables in Corporate Governance research is still an 
open issue, which requires further studies to be solved.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Model: Pooled OLS, Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
  
 Coeff std err t p-value 
 
Table I - LSDV (1/2) 
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Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.935102 Adj R-squared 0.899283 
F(101, 183) 26.10681 P-value (F) 2.67e-72 
Rho -0.204721 Durbin-Watson 1.385729 
 
Table II - LSDV (2/2) 
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Model: Pooled OLS, Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
  
 Coeff std err t p-value 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.752352 Adj R-squared 0.705724 
F(45, 239) 16.13510 P-value (F) 1.12e-50 
Rho  0.544904 Durbin-Watson 0.701734 
 
Table III – OLS model - 39 Governance variables 
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Model: FE, Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
  
 Coeff std err t p-value 
 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.943288 Adj R-squared 0.891904 
F(135, 149) 18.35773 P-value (F) 4.57e-54 
Rho -0.270566 Durbin-Watson 1.515617 
 
Table IV - Fixed-effects model - 39 Governance variables (1/2) 
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Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 149) = 5.33664, with p-value = P (F (94, 149) > 5.33664) = 7.38052e-20 
 
Test for omitted variables 
    Null hp: parameters equal to zero for the variables 
 A1 
 A3 
 A8 
 A12 
 A15 
 A16 
 A17 
 A25 
 A27 
 A28 
 A32 
 A34 
 A36 
 Test stats: F(13, 149) = 0.604938, with p-value = P (F (13, 149) > 0.604938) = 0.847289 
 
Table V - Fixed-effects model - 39 Governance variables (2/2) 
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Model: FE, Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
  
 Coeff std err t p-value 
 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.940294 Adj R-squared 0.895331 
F(122, 162) 20.91239 P-value (F) 7.39e-61 
Rho  -0.249807 Durbin-Watson 1.469388 
 
Table VI - Fixed effects - reduced model (1/2) 
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Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 162) = 6.41088, with p-value = P (F (94, 162) > 6.41088) = 5.02007e-25 
 
Test for omitted variables 
    Null hp: parameters equal to zero for the variables 
 A5 
 A9 
 A18 
 A19 
 A20 
 A21 
 A22 
 A33 
 A35 
 Test stats: F(9, 162) = 0.590013, with p-value = P (F (9, 162) > 0.590013) = 0.804007 
 
 
Table VII - Fixed effects - reduced model (2/2) 
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Model: FE, Nr obs: 285, inc. 95 cross-section units 
Periods: 3 
Dep var: TOBIN_Q 
Robust std err (HAC) 
 
 Coeff std err t p-value 
 
 
Av. Dep var 1.495459 Std dev dep var 0.816459 
R-squared 0.938313 Adj R-squared 0.898144 
F(122, 172) 23.35938 P-value (F) 1.76E-66 
Rho -0.233128 Durbin-Watson 1.448433 
 
Test for the difference in the group intercepts 
Null hp: groups have a common intercept 
Test stats: F(94, 172) = 7.81345, with p-value = P (F (94, 172) > 7.81345) = 5.01865e-31 
 
Table VIII - Fixed effects model, positive variables 
